Abstract
Introduction
A management information system (MIS) oriented around the provision of information to users in support of decision making. Decision support systems (DSS), a subset MIS, are even more strongly oriented around the support of decision making. Such systems may employ a number of models which are used to produce meaningful information in a form usable by decision makers.
Large databases supporting such systems are made practical by more economic storage of data on mass storage devices and by the rapid access of that data by users. Storage of data on direct access devices maintained online allows realtime updating and inquiry. Database management systems have made the data available for use by an increasing number of less sophisticated users. Concomitantly, the merging of communications and computer technologies has resulted in a revolution in data transmission and the remote access of data. Thus, larger and larger databases are practical and can be made available to more users at less cost. The implications of these trends are only dimly perceived by those presently involved.
As computer-based information systems have incorporated the results of these technological drives, concerns have grown in the areas of confidentiality and security. In many systems the unauthorized access of sensitive data files represents a serious threat.
Some files may contain data of a personal or a confidential nature, e.g., medical files or credit files. The unauthorized access of or tampering with data in such files may result in not only serious legal problems for the file owner, but damage, inconvenience, or embarrassment to the subject who has been compromised.
Data of a sensitive or critical nature, e.g., specialized mailing lists, results of marketing surveys, results of experiments, geological studies, etc., may result in a serious competitive disadvantage for an organization if accessed by an unauthorized user.
The unauthorized access and changing of data may also be the basis for serious fraud.
Security of the contents and the resources of a computer-based system is usually accomplished by control of physical access and the use of account codes and/or passwords. Various levels of file access authorization, e.g., read only, add records only, etc., may also be used as a control. In addition, access to individual files or programs may be limited, e.g., by the use of Iockwords or by securing the physical volumes.
The problem is perhaps more pronounced when sensitive data is passed over telecommunications lines. If the lines are "tapped," the data can be copied easily onto tape recording equipment and then played back offline onto a terminal device to produce a hard copy.
Cryptography
Cryptography, or privacy transformation as it is sometimes called, may be used as a final defense in the safeguarding of sensitive data. Cryptography is concerned not with hiding or masking the existence of sensitive data but with transforming the data in such a way that it is unintelligible to anyone without knowledge of the reverse transformation.
The following two definitions are used in the literature of cryptography:
Plaintexl is undisguised data that is intelligible to all.
Ciphertext is plaintext after it has undergone a cryptographic transformation.
Both the transformation and the reverse transformation must be a one-to-one correspondence, i.e., no ambiguity must exist in the results of either direction transformation. Figure 1 illustrates these concepts.
Cryptanalysis is concerned with transforming a ciphertext back into plaintext without prior knowledge of the original transformation. The effectiveness or the usefulness of any cryptographic transformation must be judged in terms of its resistance to cryptanalysis.
There are two basic classes of cryptographic transformation: transposition and substitution. In addition, characters may be transformed monographically, Le., one character at a time, or polygraphically, i.e., two or more characters at a time.
Transposition
Transposition involves a rearrangement of the characters in the plaintext into a new sequence. The characters of the plaintext remain the same but their relative positions are changed. The transformation follows a set of rules for forming the new character sequence. As an example, the plaintext, CRYPTOGRAPHY, might be transformed to the ciphertext, AOYPGPHIRYCTR.
The characters of the alphabet in any natural language do not occur with equal frequency.
The most frequently occurring letter in English is E, which appears in a sample of text as apwoximately 13% of the total number of letters in the text. Similarly, the least frequent letter in English is Z which appears approximately 0.1% of the time. Thus, there is a relatively wide range in the frequency distribution of the letters in the English alphabet.
Since the letters of the alphabet contained in the plaintext do not change after undergoing a transposition encipherment, the frequency distribution of the letters also remains unchanged. The most logical conclusion that can be drawn by a cryptanalyst facing a ciphertext with a frequency distribution approximating normal English, is that the text has probably undergone only a transposition transformation. Consequently, transposition methods offer little security against cryptanalysis.
Substitution
The characters of the plaintext are replaced by other characters in a substitution transformation. As opposed to transposition, the individual characters retain their positions in the text. Various techniques of scrambling the alphabet can be used. The most sophisticated monalphabetic substitution transforms each plaintext letter into a ciphertext letter in a pseudo-random fashion. Ideally, the cipher alphabet should be randomly distributed in such a way that there is an equal chance of any remaining letter appearing as a ciphertext equivalent of a plaintext letter.
It should be noted that with a monoalphabetic substitution there will be a wide variation in the letter frequencies, and that this variation should approximate the variation in normal English. The difference between the ciphertext distribution and the normal English distribution lies in which letters are relatively frequent or infrequent. Frequency analysis is the key to the solution of such a cipher. The heart of cryptanalysis lies in the application of the analyst's knowledge of letter frequencies, digram (two letter pairs) frequencies, and trigram (three letter groups) frequencies. A monoalphabetic substitution cipher offers a relatively low degree of security as a result.
If multiple cipher alphabets are used, then there must be a rule or algorithm for selecting these alphabets in the proper order. As the number of independent cipher alphabets used increases, the frequency distribution of the ciphertext flattens out. Ideally, a system is desired which will transform each plaintext letter into a ciphertext letter independently such that there is an equal probability that a given plaintext letter will be transformed into any of the 26 letters of the cipher alphabets.
In other words, any ciphertext letter has an equal chance of representing any plaintext letter. In such an ideal transformation the frequency distribution of the ciphertext approaches equal probability for all letters. As a consequence, maximum information, in information theory terms, is needed to break such a cipher. Facing a flat frequency distribution of the letters of the ciphertext, the cryptanalyst is denied the use of a direct frequency analysis.
Ciphertext that is transformed by a polyalphabetic substitution consists of a combination of more than one monoalphabetic substitution.
Some plaintext characters are transformed by cipher alphabet 1, some plaintext characters by cipher alphabet 2, etc. If it can be determined which ciphertext characters have been transformed by the same cipher alphabet, then a number of monoalphabetic substitutions face the cryptanalyst and monoalphabetic substitutions are solvable, given sufficient text. If, through trial and error, a successful segmentation of a polyalphabetically transformed ciphertext into monoalphabetic components is achieved, the frequency distribution of the cipher text characters within each monoalphabetic component approaches that of plaintext.
The simplest rule for enciphering plaintext involves selecting from the cipher alphabets in sequential order, Le., plaintext character 1 is enciphered by cipher alphabet 1, plaintext character 2 by cipher alphabet 2 ..... plaintext character n by cipher alphabet n, plaintext character n+l by cipher alphabet 1, etc. A well established method developed by Friedman [5] called the Kappatest breaks up the polyalphabetic ciphertext into monoalphabetic components. As a surrogate for the frequency distributions the probability of pairs of characters is used.
In plaintext, the probability of a Pair of letters is:
This quantityequals approximately 0.067.
In ciphertext, assuming equal probability of any given letter, the probability of a pair of letters is: Thus, when a polyalphabetic substitution enciphered text has been successfully broken down into a number of monoalphabetic substitution enciphered texts, the number of pairs of letters within any component should increase significantly, Le., from approximately 3.9 to 6.7 per hundred.
Security is gained with a polyalphabetic substitution cipher by not allowing the repetition of a sequence of cipher alphabets or, at least, by not allowing repetition to occur to the point where reasonable lengths of texts are available in each of the monoalphabetic components. A one time system is a system in which no repetition of cipher alphabets occurs. It is the only theoretically unbreakable cipher.
Polygraphic systems
Two or more characters are transformed as a group in polygraphic substitutions. The Playfair cipher is an example of a system used by the British War Office in the nineteenth century. It is a digraphic, i.e., two characters transformed at a time, system. A 5 x 5 square is used to carry out the transformation. I and J are treated as equivalents. The following is an example.
MANGE TIJFOR S YQCH BU L XD WKZ PV
If a plaintext pair appears in different rows and columns of the square, each character is replaced by the character in its row and in the column of the other character. In the example, pair CR is transformed into HO. If a pair appears in the same row, the characters immediately to the right of each are used; if a pair appears in the same column the characters immediately below each are used. Columns and rows are considered cyclical, Le., they wrap around. In the example, the plaintext pair TO is enciphered as IR, or JR. The plaintext, CRYPTOGRAPHY, would be transformed into the ciphertext,
HOCKIR-EOGKSQ.
In general, the security of a polygraphic system is greater than that of a monographic system. In addition, the security increases as the number of characters transformed together increases. This increase in security arises from the existence of more digrams than single letters; the frequency distribution of digrams is flatter than for single letters, These observations are even truer for trigrams, etc. Unfortunately, if one letter is garbled, then so is the entire group of letters in the unit. The longer the polygram, the greater the loss.
Historically polygraphic substitution methods have been overshadowed by monographic substitution methods. This is probably because of the inconvenience and sometimes time consuming nature of the encipherment methods. With computerized transformation, however, this should no longer be a problem. 
Computer-based Systems
The most fundamental computer-based approach is a pseudo-random string of bits, or digits, which can be combined with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext.
The Vernam [7] system was first used on telegraph systems. Two tapes are read into the transmitting machine: one tape contains the plaintext message, the other contains a string of pseudo-random digits. An exclusive logical OR operation is performed and the result is the enciphered text. The example below represents both the plain text and the pseudo-random string as bit strings. The advantage of this system is that the same key tape is used to both encipher and decipher. The disadvantage is that a key must be produced which is as long as the plaintext. For heavy traffic, this is a serious problem which can be eased by using multiple tapes containing numbers of entries relatively prime to each other. For example, using a two tape system: the first key tape contains 1000 pseudo-random numbers and the second key tape contains 1001 pseudorandom numbers. The two key tapes form loops which repeat.
The plaintext is combined with the first key in an exclusive logical OR. The result of this operation is combined with the second key in another exclusive logical OR. The number of combinations possible with the two tapes is the product, Le., 1,001,000. This approach can be extended to three or more tapes. One disadvantage is that security must now be provided for the tapes from production to use, and perhaps after use.
The pseudo-random sequence required for the key can be generated by either hardware or software. The most common hardware device is the shift register. The sequence generated repeats after 2 n-1 bits, where n is the number of stages.
Software may incorporate a random number generator. Security lies in the constants of the algorithm itself and in the seed. Safeguarding only several numbers may be an advantage in this case.
All random number generators repeat; therefore, a critical factor is the length of an unrepeated sequence. Two or more independent generators could be used in a Vernam multiple tape fashion.
An alternative is to store the random sequence on a demountable storage medium such as a magnetic tape or disc pack. The device is kept safeguarded and mounted only when needed under proper supervision. Again, two or more sequences may be combined in a Vernam multiple tape fashion. This presents an additional complication. With a random number generator, the seed selects the start of the sequence, with a stored pseudo-random string, it must be assured that any part of the string is not accidently repeatedly used.
Data Encryption Standard
In 1977 the National Bureau of Standards, after soliciting recommendations for a standard encryption algorithm, accepted a proposal by IBM. The algorithm was based on work by Feistel [4] and has come to be known as the Data Encryption Standard (DES). It now a required standard used by all federal agencies to protect all data where encryption is deemed necessary. It does not affect the current handling of classified or atomic energy data. The algorithm is required to be implemented in hardware for federal agencies. It is possible to implement the standard in software for non-federal agencies.
A cipher using alternating transposition and substitution is frequently called a product cipher. Essentially the DES uses a product cipher scheme. A 64 bit, or 8 byte, plaintext block is combined with a 64 bit key. The key consists of a 56 bit pseudo-random bit string and 8 parity bits. A 64 bit ciphertext block is produced as output.
A major criticism by Diffie and Hellman [3] is that a machine capable of breaking DES ciphertext is now within the state of the art. The pseudo-random string of 56 bits used with the standard is one of 2 s6 possible strings. It is argued that an exhaustive search. of these possible strings can be carried out successfully on a machine constructed for an estimated $20,000,000. The estimated time would be about 12 hours. Declining hardware costs would reduce this amount substantially in the next ten years. It has also been argued that an increase in the length of the pseudorandom string to 128 or 256 bits would prevent any such cryptanalytic approach. The DES has also been defended by the National Bureal of Standards, e.g., Davis [1] . The argument for the standard stresses that any exhaustive search could not be carried out successfully in a reasonable period to time.
Public Key Cryptosystems
One of the difficulties associated with the use of a cryptographic system over telecommunications links is the distribution of the cipher keys. The keys must be distributed to all using locations by some secure means. These methods of distribution are commonly courier or mail. Although generally reliable, these distribution channels are subject to compromise. Diffie and Hellman [2] introduced the concept of the public key cryptosystem. By separating the enciphering key from the deciphering key, a public key cryptosystem eliminates the need to distribute any keys securely. In addition, the capability exists for obtaining a digital signature, Le., authentication that a ciphertext message received was in fact sent by the alleged transmitter, and, in fact, cannot be denied by the transmitter.
In a public key system every participant has a personal cipher. The encryption algorithm is public knowledge and may even be published in a directory. If user I wishes to participate in this public system, user l's encryption algorithm is made public, but the decryption algorithm is kept private and available only to user 1. Any other user may, therefore, encrypt a message for user 1 and only user 1 may decrypt it since only user 1 possesses the decryption algorithm.
The encrypting key in the above scheme must be such that the deciphering key cannot be deduced from it, i.e., the computational workload required to do so would be enormous.
A digital signature is obtained with the above scheme as follows.
Assume that user 1 wishes to transmit a message to user 2. User 1 uses his or her own private decryption algorithm to "decrypt" the plaintext. User 1 then encrypts the message using user 2's public encryption algorithm. User 2 decrypts using his or her private decryption algorithm and then "encrypts" using user l's public encryption algorithm. The "encrypted" message produces the original plaintext only if the private decryption algorithm has been used by the sender. Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman [6] offer one implementation strategy. Their method treats the plaintext as a number which is then raised to a power. The result is divided by the product of two prime numbers. The remainder is the ciphertext.
Conclusions
The growing concern over confidentiality and security of stored and transmitted data in a computer-based information system may be addressed in part by the use of cryptographic transformations on the data.
The use of cryptography does not lessen the requirements for both physical and access security, but complements them and provides a final defense should these safeguards be circumvented.
As with all security measures, the cost in terms of additional processing time, safeguarding of encryption/decryption keys, inconvenience to legitimate users, etc., can only be judged in terms of the potential loss incurred by a compromise of the data.
Cryptography has been veiled in mystery primarily because its use, until recently, was limited to military and diplomatic applications. Today, computer technology and new mathematical techniques have begun to revolutionize the field. New technology and methods are making implementation and use of relatively sophisticated cryptog~'aphic techniques practical in many new areas. This capability is growing at a time when interest in data security techniques is also growing.
In the future, the use of cryptographic transformations implemented in either hardware or software will become commonplace at computer installations.
At a minimum, transformations will be applied to those few files in an organization's database that contain sensitive data. Information systems personnel must become familiar with this field to make the technical and economic analyses needed to evaluate alternative cryptographic approaches.
